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	OCA 89-2748 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY Office of Congressional Affairs Washington, D.C. 20505 Telephone: 482-6136
	TO: <input type="text"/> NSA Legislative Liaison
<div style="text-align: right;">4 August 1989</div> <div style="text-align: center;"><input type="text"/> Enclosed is the KAL 007 letter that we discussed. <input type="text"/> Office of Congressional Affairs Enclosure</div>	

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Office of Congressional Affairs
Washington, D.C. 20505
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Assistant to Secretary for
Intelligence Policy

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July 27, 1989

The Honorable William H. Webster
 Director of Central Intelligence
 Central Intelligence Agency
 Washington, D.C. 20530

Dear Judge Webster:

On December 30, 1980, Senator Sam Nunn, as Chairman of the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, sent a letter to the Central Intelligence Agency requesting a response to certain allegations regarding the American intelligence community's actions in the August 31, 1983, shooting down of Korean Air Lines (KAL) flight 007. On March 7, 1989, you responded by letter to Senators Nunn, Kennedy and Kerry, advising them that neither the CIA nor any other agency in the American intelligence community was involved with KAL 007.

Inasmuch as your letter did not respond to the specific questions posed in the December 30, 1988 letter, the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations staff has again contacted the CIA regarding this issue.

On March 20, 1989, [] CIA Congressional Liaison, met with the Permanent Subcommittee staff and assured them that the CIA had conducted an extensive investigation into this matter. [] further advised that your letter of March 7, 1989 was written with the intent that it could be shared with the public. The Subcommittee staff requested further information on the matter. On May 1, 1989, [] advised them that a classified briefing on the matter could be provided to interested Senators and staff.

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At this point, I believe it is essential that the CIA provide a coordinated intelligence community briefing on the investigation conducted in response to Senator Nunn's December 30, 1988 letter for the Members of the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigation. To alleviate any security concerns, the briefing will be coordinated through the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. Senator Nunn's letter requested that the CIA respond to the following allegations:

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The Honorable William H. Webster

July 27, 1989

- 1) Did the United States intelligence community place, or assist in placing, a radar signal registration device and/or a pulse coded modulation system on board KAL flight 007? If not, did any foreign intelligence service place the aforementioned devices on KAL flight 007? According to material provided to the Subcommittee, these devices were allegedly manufactured by the Victor Dalmo Company.
- 2) Did the United States intelligence community have any role in directing KAL flight 007 to fly over Soviet territory?
- 3) Did the United States intelligence community routinely use civilian aircraft to skirt Soviet territory in order to monitor Soviet air defense reactions?
- 4) Did United States military and civilian air traffic controllers know of KAL flight 007's course deviation? If so, did they warn KAL flight 007? And if not, why not?
- 5) Did the United States intelligence community confiscate or destroy the United States Air Force's Minimally Attended Radar Station's tapes relating to KAL flight 007?

Enclosed for your review are questions compiled by the families of the victims of KAL 007. Senators Kennedy and Kerry previously relayed these questions to the CIA in separate correspondence.

Sincerely,


David L. Boren
Chairman

Enclosure

QUESTIONS PROVIDED TO SENATOR NUNN

March 8, 1988

QUESTIONS FOR KAL 007 INQUIRY

1. Did the KAL 007 crew know it was off course before the airliner was shot down?
2. Did the FAA controller at Anchorage know that KAL 007 was off course and heading toward Soviet airspace before the airliner was shot down?
3. Did any members of the U.S. military know that KAL 007 was off course and heading toward Soviet airspace before the airliner was shot down?
4. Did pilots or crew members of other aircraft know that KAL 007 was off course before the airliner was shot down?
5. Did the Japanese know -- either military or civilian -- that KAL 007 was off course and heading toward Soviet airspace before the airliner was shot down?
6. If anyone knew that KAL 007 was off course before the airliner was shot down, why did no one take action to warn the crew?
7. Why are there two mutually contradictory versions of the U.S. radar track of KAL 007's flight over the Alaskan mainland?
8. Why does the released copy of the FAA Anchorage radio tape parallel to the Tokyo radio tape in frequency and time fail to register KAL 007 and KAL 015 and associated Tokyo radio transmissions after 1809 Z (Zebra Time), that is, during the critical events in the disaster itself.
9. Why does the time signal on the Anchorage radio tape drop by six decibels during the period 1837-1840:30 Z that is precisely during the period that KAL 007 exploded or suffered a fast burn in mid air?
10. What is the meaning of the notations in Captain Chun's handwriting in KAL 007's computerized flight plan filed at Anchorage?
11. Why is there a 6 minute and 20 second gap between the HF section of the Tokyo Radio tape and the VHF section that follows it -- 1835:40-1842:00 Z?

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12. Where did the wreckage of KAL 007 actually hit the water in the Sea of Japan?

13. What were the findings of the dives made by Dr. Robert Ballard of Woods Hole on behalf of the U.S. Navy.

14. Is there any evidence to suggest that KAL 007 was carrying sophisticated intelligence equipment whose function was unrelated to KAL 007's status as a commercial common-carrier airliner?

QUESTIONS PROVIDED BY THE FAMILY

January 3, 1989

1. The tape of data shown on the consolidated radarscope at Elmendorf AFB which would have shown KE 007's track was erased. Were these data received elsewhere in the system, at NORAD for example? If so, may we please see them? May we see the log?
2. How many U.S. military aircraft were operating north of Shemya and south of Karaginski Island at the time KE 007 passed through? What were their missions? What were their flight tracks relative to KE 007's? What were their altitudes? What was KE 007's?
3. What recordings were made of the transmissions of Soviet interceptor aircraft and their ground controllers at the time KE 007 approached and crossed the Kamchatka peninsula? May we please see a transcript?
4. In its early inquiries of the USSR the United States referred to data concerning KE 007's disappearance from U.S. radar. What relevant U.S. radar data exist? In particular, we would like to see data as to KE 007's course, altitude data and speed near and over Sakhalin Island and the course, altitude and speed of all other aircraft in its vicinity.
5. In the ICAO report it is stated that KE 007's transponder was squawking 1300 when the airliner was in Soviet airspace. What data does the intelligence community have from any source as to responses (Mode A and Mode C) from KE 007's transponder while the airliner was in Soviet airspace? When did responses from its transponder cease? What was KE 007's altitude at the time?
6. In The Target is Destroyed Seymour M. Hersh says he learned of a U.S. intelligence study which describes a turn to the right by KE 007 on approach to Sakhalin. Did the turn take place? When did it begin? What was the course followed? We would like to see the study on which Hersh was briefed.
7. On what basis were obviously classified details concerning U.S. radar and SIGINT collection made available to Hersh by members of the intelligence community? An example is the discussion in The Target is Destroyed of Soviet transcontinental communications at the time of KE 007's penetration of Soviet airspace. Also given in Hersh's book are data on the course of missions. 25X1
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8. Was the tape of the intercepted voices of the Soviet pilots over Sakhalin Island which Ambassador Kirpatrick distributed to interested missions at the U.N. on September 6, 1983 (a) made by a voice actuated recorder and (b) unedited, as she stated? If not, what editing was performed and by whom?

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9. Were the transmissions of the ground stations controlling the Soviet interceptors near and over Sakhalin Island received? If so, could we see a transcript of their transmissions with notation of the time of the transmissions?
10. Are the transmissions attributed to KE 007 as recorded by Japanese air traffic control authorities and shown on the transcript distributed to the press by FAA on or about September 11, 1983 authentic as to content and time? If not, please describe the changes made? Who made them?
11. An Anchorage Radio tape covering KE 007 and KE 015 HF communications with Tokyo Radio has been released by FAA under FOIA. It fails to register any KE 007 transmissions 1707:45 - 1847:39 GMT. Is it a full and unedited representation of the material received by Anchorage Radio?
12. Why did the U.S. Navy spend a month (late September - late October, 1983) searching and/or recovering objects from the ocean floor in a small area northwest of Moneron Island? What was it seeking? What did it find? What equipment and expert assistance were used in the effort?
13. Why was so little of KE 007 found (or admitted to have been found)? Why were no large pieces of the aircraft found (or admitted to have been found)? Why were so few bodies found (or admitted to have been found)? Why did the verticle fin of the tail assembly fragment? Why were the voice and flight data recorders not recovered?